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Abstract
This paper presents a model of entry with endogenous product-type choices. These choices are
formalized as the outcomes of a game of incomplete information in which rivals’ diﬀerentiated
products have non-uniform competitive eﬀects on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The model is estimated for
location choices in the video retail industry using a nested ﬁxed-point algorithm solution. The
results imply signiﬁcant payoﬀs to product diﬀerentiation. Simulations illustrate the tradeoﬀ be-
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1 Introduction
This paper studies ﬁrms’ joint entry and product-type choices in retail markets where location
choice constitutes a form of product diﬀerentiation. While previous studies of entry have modeled
the trade-oﬀ between the available demand in a market and the intensity of competition faced by
a new entrant in that market due to its attractiveness to incumbents, the strategic importance of
product-type choice within a market has received less attention. For example, Bresnahan and Reiss
(1988, 1991) and Berry (1992) show that the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in a market increases
in response to increases in market demand and ﬁrms experience a decline in proﬁts due to the
entry of additional competitors. Since the authors consider well-deﬁned, homogeneous products
and markets, the ﬁrms in their studies have no scope to oﬀer customers diﬀerentiated products. In
industries with heterogeneous product and market characteristics, however, dissimilarities between
competitors’ products imply varying intensities of competition between ﬁrms. Research going
back to Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) has shown how to incorporate such cases into spatial
models to more accurately predict the number of ﬁrms that are supported in markets with product
diﬀerentiation.
I consider how one speciﬁc product-type choice, namely the physical location within a market chosen
by a retail ﬁrm, aﬀects that ﬁrm’s entry decision. As an instrument of product diﬀerentiation, a ﬁrm
can strategically choose a location when entering a market to expose itself to as little competition
as possible for any given level of market demand. The paper complements other recent applied
work on the role of geography in microeconomic decision-making. Studies such as Davis (2001),
Manuszak (2000), Pinske, Slade, and Brett (2002), and Thomadsen (2002) quantify the importance
of spatial diﬀerentiation for own- and cross-price elasticities, taking the locations of ﬁrms relative
to each other as given. While these studies explicitly focus on the post-entry competition stage
between retail establishments, the empirical modeling approaches are very similar to the ones used
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here. The distance between consumers and stores is, for example, treated as a store characteristic
that directly aﬀects consumers’ utility. Similarly, to readily measure such distances, the space that
a market covers is divided into separate neighborhoods or locations along Census-delineated lines.
The attractiveness of spatial location as a form of product diﬀerentiation rests on this use of physical
distance as an objective measure of the dissimilarity between ﬁrms’ products. The model in this
paper can, however, be easily extended to other, more complex forms of product diﬀerentiation to
study the role of optimal positioning in characteristic space on market structure more generally.
Modeling the joint choice of entry and product type is a complex problem. The industrial or-
ganization literature, such as Sutton (1991, 1998), has recognized that market structure reveals
information about ﬁrms’ underlying economic proﬁts, which in turn provides information about
the intensity of competition between ﬁrms in the market. Mazzeo (2002) builds upon this concept
by noting that ﬁrms’ product type choices provide additional information about the underlying
competitive interaction between diﬀerentiated ﬁrms. His paper develops an equilibrium model of
entry and quality-level choice.1 An analytically appealing feature of his model is that ﬁrms pos-
sess complete information about competitors; however, the resulting Nash equilibrium concept is
computationally diﬃcult to verify for a large number of diﬀerent product types. The application
of the model to the motel industry shows that even with three quality levels, estimation becomes
burdensome due to the large number of proﬁt constraints that must hold in equilibrium.
Following Mazzeo (2002), I incorporate the eﬀect on market structure of varying competitive inten-
sities between diﬀerentiated products. In contrast to the complete information framework, however,
the model presented here recognizes that idiosyncratic sources of proﬁtability may be of importance
in driving the location decision and, furthermore, that such ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁtability may be diﬃ-
cult to observe by competitors with certainty. Examples include diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ cost structures
1Related work in this area includes Ellickson (2003), Stavins (1995), and Toivanen and Waterson (2001b). For reviews
of empirical research on discrete choice game-theoretic models, see Toivanen and Waterson (2001a) and Reiss (1996).
2
or their intangible assets, such as staﬀ managerial talent, customer service, and inventory main-
tenance. Consequently, I allow ﬁrms to possess private information about their own proﬁtability,
which is observed by competitors only in distribution. Payoﬀs are thus a function of the ﬁrm’s ex-
pectation of its competitors’ optimal location choices, as well as its own idiosyncratic proﬁtability.
The resulting Bayesian Nash equilibrium conjectures over competitors’ optimal location strate-
gies, which represent the likelihood of entering a particular location rather than the exact location
choice, can be derived more easily than the equilibrium in the complete information framework.2
This set-up, therefore, facilitates the application of the model to a realistic, large-dimensional set
of product types.
The model is applied to the location choices of video retailers in 151 medium-sized markets. Op-
timal store location is a strategic advantage in this industry because the cost of the transaction
is small relative to the transportation costs that consumers incur. The empirical results bear out
the intuition that ﬁrms use spatial diﬀerentiation to shield themselves from a large fraction of
competitors in the market. Distant competitors are found to drive down payoﬀs signiﬁcantly less
than competitors close-by and such competitive interaction helps to explain the patterns of location
choices found in the data. These data show that while highly populated areas are chosen by many
ﬁrms, locations with less attractive demographic make-ups experience some clustering of ﬁrms as
well. In the absence of competitive interaction between ﬁrms, however, ﬁrms’ location choices
would mirror the distribution of demand in the market more closely.
The signiﬁcant payoﬀs to product diﬀerentiation imply that the scope for diﬀerentiation as measured
by the market’s area, or more generally, the overall size of the product space, may be an important
2The estimation of empirical auction models such as the symmetric independent private values model similarly relies
on the computation (and inversion) of Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategies to recover bidders’ unobserved
valuations of an object. Recent non-parametric approaches such as Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Athey
and Haile (2002) allow for greater ﬂexibility in the assumptions governing the distribution of such valuations, which
may also be of use in models such as the one estimated here. For recent surveys of this literature, see Hendricks and
Paarsch (1995), Laﬀont (1997), and Perrigne and Vuong (1999).
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determinant of market structure. To illustrate the importance of the size of the product space,
I simulate, based on the estimated parameters, the eﬀect on the entry process of the geographic
dispersion of demand as a market’s population and area grow. As the market area grows, the ability
of ﬁrms to achieve greater localized market power through spatial diﬀerentiation is found to have a
signiﬁcant impact on overall entry. At the same time, however, payoﬀs from such diﬀerentiation are
oﬀset by the negative eﬀect of reduced demand due to the dispersion of population in the increased
market area. I ﬁnd that for the speciﬁc example of the video retail industry with highly localized
demand, the net eﬀect of these two forces is that as a market’s population and area grow, the
number of ﬁrms supported by the market increases only slightly.
While these results apply only to medium-sized markets in the video retail industry, the model’s
relevance extends to other industries in larger geographic markets. In particular, the model may be
of use in horizontal merger analyses to deﬁne the geographic boundaries of markets. By allowing the
competitive interaction between ﬁrms to diﬀer by ﬁnely partitioned distance ranges, the estimated
competitive eﬀects would indicate how large the distance between two ﬁrms has to be at a minimum
for them to no longer exert any competitive pressures on each other. Such a distance cut-oﬀ is of
help in demarcating the geographic boundaries of such ﬁrms’ competitive environment in a given
city. Since the model treats location as a product attribute, the complimentary questions that arise
in horizontal merger analyses of the relevant product market can be analyzed similarly for other
non-spatial product characteristics.
Section 2 presents the model of entry and location choice and section 3 describes the data set used
for estimation. Section 4 presents a set of estimates for a model of entry that ignores the eﬀect of
product diﬀerentiation. In section 5, I outline the estimation routine and present some base-line
results and counterfactual exercises. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the main features of
the model and their economic implications.
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2 Model
2.1 Motivation and Set-up
The use of discrete strategic games in empirical modeling has to date been limited. Manski (1993)
points to the mutual dependence of agents’ choices on each other as a major diﬃculty in empirically
implementing models with strategic interactions or endogenous eﬀects. This interdependence makes
the application of such models to individual ﬁrm behavior more diﬃcult as it oftentimes entails the
existence of multiple equilibria to the discrete game.
The existing literature has dealt with the multiplicity of equilibria in several ways. Tamer (2003)
builds upon earlier work by Jovanovic (1989) to derive an upper and a lower bound for the prob-
ability of observing each non-unique outcome of the game. By imposing support conditions, the
model’s parameters are point identiﬁed and can be estimated using a semi-parametric maximum
likelihood estimator such as the one suggested in Manski and Tamer (2002). Andrews and Berry
(2003) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2003) suggest a related approach that identiﬁes bounds rather
than point estimates of the parameters of interest. Ciliberto and Tamer (2003) also present a ﬁrst
empirical application of these procedures that studies airline market structure.
Work by Berry (1992), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), and Berry and Waldfogel (1999) suggests
instead to specify a model that combines multiple equilibria for individual players’ actions into one
joint equilibrium that can be uniquely predicted. In the entry context, for example, such models
are able to uniquely predict the equilibrium number of entrants into a market, but not the identity
of such entrants. Symmetry assumptions are necessary to generate a unique prediction for the
equilibrium number of entrants, namely that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are invariant to permutations of the
entry decisions made by their opponents. Mazzeo (2002) relaxes this symmetry assumption by
introducing ﬁrms whose products are diﬀerentiated into discrete types and conditions the analysis
on the number of ﬁrms of each type that enters. The complete information nature of his model
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makes it computationally infeasible, however, to extend the analysis to more than three types of
ﬁrms.
This paper instead develops a strategy of estimating discrete strategic games by allowing for asym-
metric information about players’ payoﬀs. Analyzing discrete strategic interactions in an incomplete
information framework was ﬁrst suggested by Rust (1994) in the context of discrete dynamic multi-
player games. I apply his framework to the computationally simpler static set-up, in line with
much of the empirical literature on entry. As pointed out by Rust (1994), the main advantages of
the imperfect information framework are that equilibrium strategies can be easily computed for a
large-dimensional set of product types. While the assumption of imperfect information does not
rule out the existence of multiple equilibria per se, simulation evidence shows that the speciﬁc
application of the model to spatial location choice eliminates such multiplicity.
At the beginning of the period, each ﬁrm makes its joint entry and location choice based on expected
post-entry proﬁts. These proﬁts are driven by two opposing forces. On the one hand, favorable
demand characteristics of a location attract ﬁrms to that location. At the same time, the increased
concentration of ﬁrms at that location adversely impacts ﬁrm proﬁts due to greater competition.
Following Manski (1993), the dependence of ﬁrm behavior on the behavior of rivals in the market
is treated as an endogenous eﬀect highlighting that the choices of one player aﬀect the choices of
another. Firm proﬁt is thus speciﬁed as a function of the demand in the ﬁrm’s location, as well as
the equilibrium location choices of all other competitors in the market.
Proﬁts are also allowed to vary between ﬁrms in the same location on account of diﬀerences in cost
structures and other ﬁrm-speciﬁc sources of proﬁtability, which are assumed to be ex-ante observed
only by the ﬁrm itself. This assumption regarding incomplete information about competitors’
proﬁtability is reasonable; for example, the managerial talent of a ﬁrm’s employees cannot be easily
observed by competitors who must separate the role of such intangible assets in a ﬁrm’s success
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from other related proﬁt shifters. Entry and location choices are thus determined by the demand
characteristics of the market, ﬁrms’ expectations of their competitors’ optimal location choices, and
each ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic proﬁtability.
2.1.1 Sequence of Moves
Firms’ entry and location choices are analyzed as a discrete choice problem. A set of F potential
entrants simultaneously chooses whether or not to enter a market m and where within the market
to locate. The number of potential entrants exceeds one and is commonly known by all F players.
For simplicity, ﬁrms are assumed to make independent entry and location choices.3 The set of
possible locations in the market is indexed by l = 0, 1, ...,Lm, which includes the decision not to
enter given by l = 0. The locations are thus discrete and each location can accommodate more
than one ﬁrm. Figure 1 displays the decision tree. Firm f ’s location decision, with f = 1, ...,F , is
denoted by df , where dfl = 1 if location l is chosen, 0 otherwise.
2.1.2 Payoﬀs
Upon entry, ﬁrm f ’s payoﬀ in location l in a market m is given by the following reduced form:4
Πfl = Xlβ + ξ + h(Γ.l,n) + εfl (2.1)
= Πl + εfl
3The model thus ignores one dimension of the decision-making process for multi-product ﬁrms and chain stores,
namely the potential for cannibalization of revenues of existing products or established stores when introducing
a new product or opening a new outlet. The signiﬁcance of this assumption will depend in each case upon the
particular empirical setting.
4This speciﬁcation of the proﬁt function is chosen primarily to simplify estimation given the unavailability of ﬁrm-
level market shares. This limitation on available data is shared by other work in the ﬁeld, such as Berry (1992) and
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). To model homogeneous product markets, they use a similar payoﬀ function interpreted
as the log of a market size/demand term multiplied by a variable proﬁt term that depends on the number of market
competitors. Correspondingly, the empirical setting in this paper is an industry with a product that could be viewed
as homogeneous, while store characteristics, and in particular stores’ locations, are the main factors of diﬀerentiation
between ﬁrms. For an example of a study that uses ﬁrm-level market share information, see Berry and Waldfogel
(1999).
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where market superscripts m have been omitted to simplify the exposition. The ﬁrst two terms
represent demand characteristics that aﬀect payoﬀs in location l. Xl is a vector of demand and cost
characteristics speciﬁc to location l, including population and median rent. Since the demographic
characteristics that can be observed by the econometrician may not reﬂect all cost and demand
factors driving ﬁrm proﬁtability, unobservable exogenous diﬀerences across markets are captured
by a market-level eﬀect, ξ, which is a random draw from the known distribution G(·). All cost
and demand shifters including ξ are known to the ﬁrm and its competitors at the time of decision
making. The next term, h(Γ.l,n), captures the eﬀect on proﬁts due to competition from all rivals in
the market. Non-uniform competitive interaction between diﬀerent product types requires, in the
case of space as a diﬀerentiating characteristic, a two-dimensional matrix of competitive eﬀects by
location pairs.5 Therefore, Γ is an L ×L matrix of competitive eﬀects; for example, the lth column
of Γ, Γ.l, represents the competitive intensity between competitors in locations 1 through L and a
ﬁrm in location l. The impact on payoﬀs due to competition from other ﬁrms is thus a function
of Γ.l and n, where n is a vector containing the number of ﬁrms in each of the L locations in the
market. Mean proﬁts from not entering, Π0, are normalized to zero across ﬁrms and markets.
εfl represents the idiosyncratic component of ﬁrm f ’s proﬁts from operating in location l. The
asymmetry of information between ﬁrms arises from this idiosyncratic proﬁtability (their “type”),
which is treated as a realization of a random variable whose distribution is common knowledge
among all competitors, but whose value is private information to the ﬁrm. Following Rust (1994),
players’ information sets and types are deﬁned by the following assumption:
(A1) Independent symmetric private values: Players’ proﬁtability types ε1, ...,εF are
private information to the players and are independently distributed draws from the
same prior distribution G(·).
5A similar matrix approach can be used in other multi-dimensional characteristic spaces provided an appropriate
distance metric, corresponding to physical distance in the current application, measures the dissimilarity between
ﬁrms’ products.
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In this speciﬁcation, ε, a ﬁrm’s type, captures all diﬀerences between it and other potential entrants.
The payoﬀ function thus retains some of the symmetry underlying the payoﬀ functions common to
the empirical entry literature. As a result, proﬁts depend only on the number of entrants at every
location, and not on the entrants’ identities.6 The symmetry assumption implies that each pair of
ﬁrms will have the same conjecture about the proﬁtability of a third ﬁrm and the proﬁtability of
any pair of ﬁrms is identically distributed.
For the purposes of estimation, I make the following assumptions, which allow an identical proﬁt
function to be applied to every location in the market and across markets with varying numbers of
locations:
(A2) h(Γ.l;n) =
L∑
k=1
γklnk.
(A3) γkl = γk′l = γb if db ≤ dkl, dk′l < db+1, where db and db+1 denote cut-oﬀs that
deﬁne a distance band.
Assumption (A2) implies that competitors’ eﬀects are additively separable across locations and,
furthermore, that the incremental impact on payoﬀs of an additional ﬁrm in a given location is
constant. This is in contrast to previous work by Berry (1992) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)
who employ more ﬂexible functional forms that allow for h(.) to be decreasing in n at a declining
rather than constant rate. Relaxing assumption (A2) is of computational rather than conceptual
diﬃculty. Since there is ex-ante uncertainty over rivals’ location choices, the ﬁrm needs to form an
expectation of how many competitors it will face in each location. The linear speciﬁcation in (A2)
simpliﬁes the computation of the expected competition from all ﬁrms, the importance of which will
become clear in the later discussion of the equilibrium in the model.
6Symmetry is maintained in this paper solely for computational reasons. It can be relaxed to allow for more het-
erogeneous payoﬀ functions. Einav (2003), for example, estimates a sequential, Bayesian timing game applied to
heterogeneous movie producers’ choices of movie release dates.
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Assumption (A3) accommodates irregularities in the data that aﬀect estimation of the model. The
sample market locations, as further described in Section 3, consist of population-weighted centroids
of 1990 Census tracts. Census tracts vary in area and shape due to diﬀerences in population
between tracts as well as regional diﬀerences in city planning. The irregularity of Census tracts
implies that no two tract centroids are at the exact same distance from each other as others in the
market, as illustrated in ﬁgure 2, which depicts the tracts that make up one of the sample markets,
Wilmington, NC. Assumption (A3) implies that ﬁrms located in diﬀerent cells, k and k′, but within
a given distance range from location l have the same impact on the proﬁtability of ﬁrms in location
l, across locations in a market and across markets.7 As a result, rivals located in tracts within a
certain distance band around location l exert the same competitive pressure on a ﬁrm in location
l.
Allowing for a maximum of B distance bands, indexed by b = 0, 1, ..., B, the resulting payoﬀ
function is given by:
Πfl = ξ +Xlβ +
∑
b
γbNbl + εfl (2.2)
In equation 2.2, γb represents the impact of competitors in distance band b. γ0 measures the
competitive eﬀect of ﬁrms at a distance between zero and d1, γ1 the competitive eﬀect of ﬁrms at a
distance between d1 and d2, and so forth.8 The aggregate number of ﬁrms in locations within each
of these distance bands is given by Nb. Speciﬁcally, Nbl =
∑
k
I
b
klnk, where I
b
kl = 1 if db ≤ dkl < db+1
and 0 otherwise.
7Note some of the potential problems with this approach: the competitive pressure exerted by two ﬁrms located in a
single location to the north of l will be the same as the competitive pressure of two ﬁrms, of which one operates in
the cell directly north of l and one in the cell directly south of l. Ideally, the ﬁrst scenario would be more attractive
to ﬁrm f than the second; however, in the current treatment of competitive impacts, there will be no diﬀerence.
8The diﬀerences in area between small city center tracts and larger tracts at the outskirts imply that a ﬁrm’s immediate
competitors are not identiﬁed uniformly across locations if only competitors in the same location as the ﬁrm are
included as such immediate competitors. Instead, I set the eﬀect of competitors in the ﬁrst distance band around
a ﬁrm’s location to be the same as that of competitors in the ﬁrm’s own location. Given a short radius for the
ﬁrst distance band, this modiﬁcation will not, in most cases, include tracts other than the tract in which the ﬁrm is
located, but will only aﬀect city centers where adjacent tracts are suﬃciently close.
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2.2 Equilibrium Location Conjectures
2.2.1 Derivation of Equilibrium Location Conjectures
This section ﬁrst analyzes ﬁrms’ equilibrium location choices, conditioning on the total number of
ﬁrms that have decided to enter the market. The entry decision is discussed further in section 2.3.
The location decision is complicated by the fact that under an imperfect information framework,
a ﬁrm can only form an expectation of its rivals’ optimal location choices. The actual location
choice of a rival ﬁrm is determined by its realized idiosyncratic proﬁtability type. Assuming that E
ﬁrms have decided to enter the market, in equilibrium, every ﬁrm will have the same expectation
of its (E − 1) competitors’ location choices. Based on this expected competitor distribution across
all locations, each ﬁrm will choose the location that maximizes its payoﬀs given its realization of
its own proﬁtability type. The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this model is therefore
the optimal response that maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ conditional on entry, given its
self-conﬁrming conjecture about other competitors’ strategies.
For each ﬁrm f , the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium location choice, δf , is given by:
δf (εf ) ∈ argmax
df
∑
δ−f
Πf (df , δ−f ) Pr(δ−f |ξ,X,E , θ1) + εf (2.3)
where (df , δ−f ) denotes the value of the proﬁle when ﬁrm f chooses strategy df evaluated at the
ﬁrm’s type vector, εf , and the other players follow strategy δ−f evaluated at their type vectors,
ε−f .9 The payoﬀ function parameters (β, γ) have been combined into θ1. The assumption of
independent types implies that the joint probability of δ−f simpliﬁes to:
Pr(δ−f |ξ,X,E , θ1) =
∏
g =f
pg(δg|ξ,X,E , θ1) (2.4)
pgl(·) denotes the prior probability that ﬁrm g will choose location l. Applying assumption (A2)
9See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp. 209-241.
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that competitors impact a ﬁrm’s proﬁts linearly yields the expected payoﬀ in location l:10
E[Πfl] = ξ +Xlβ +
∑
b
γbE[Nbl] + εfl (2.5)
where the expected number of ﬁrms per distance band, E[Nbl], equals:
E[Nbl] =
∑
k
I
b
klE[nk] =
∑
k
I
b
kl(E − 1)pgk + Ib=0 (2.6)
The number of competitors that ﬁrm f expects to face in location l equals (E−1)pgl. The indicator
variable Ib=0, set equal to one for distance band b = 0 and zero for all remaining distance bands,
reﬂects that the number of ﬁrms in distance band b = 0 includes ﬁrm f itself were it to choose
location l.
Due to the symmetry of rivals’ types, ﬁrm f ’s probability assessment of g’s optimal location strategy
will be the same across all competitors. This probability is given by:
pgl(δg|ξ,X,E , θ1) = Pr(E[Πgl(·) + εgl] ≥ E[Πgk(·) + εgk],∀ k = l, ∀ g = f) (2.7)
For the sake of computational tractability, I assume that players’ types, ε, are i.i.d. draws from a
type 1 extreme value distribution.11
The scale parameter of the extreme value distribution captures the degree of uncertainty that a ﬁrm
has over its rivals’ proﬁtability draws. In the limit, as it tends to zero, proﬁtability draws across
locations are perfectly correlated and concentrated at the distribution’s mean. In this case, there is
10Note that relaxing assumption (A2) to incorporate a more desirable functional form for h(γ, n) that decreases in n
at a declining rate rather than linearly would involve the use of more complicated numerical integration techniques.
11As suggested by Rust (1994), the extreme-value speciﬁcation is attractive in this context because it entails closed-
form expressions for players’ choice probabilities. The computational tractability of i.i.d. Logit draws comes at a
cost, however. It implies, for example, that ﬁrm proﬁtability is uncorrelated across firms within a given location, as
well as across locations for a given ﬁrm. Thus the speciﬁcation does not consider that proﬁtability is likely to exhibit
spatial correlation since demand characteristics are spatially correlated. If such patterns were of importance, the
estimated competitive eﬀects would be biased downwards. To allow for more realistic substitution patterns across
locations, a more ﬂexible error distribution could be used. Most appropriate distributions, such as the multinomial
normal distribution, do not yield closed-form solutions for the vector of location probabilities. As a result, the
equilibrium probabilities would have to be found via multi-dimensional numerical integration or simulation nested
in the ﬁxed-point algorithm, which would signiﬁcantly increase the computational complexity of the problem.
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no uncertainty about rivals’ proﬁtability and McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) show that the outcome
of the game approaches the one of the corresponding perfect information model. In the empirical
estimation, the scale parameter is not separately identiﬁed from the remaining parameters of the
pay-oﬀ function and is therefore normalized to one. This results in traditional multinomial Logit
location probabilities for ﬁrms’ beliefs, conditional on the entry of E ﬁrms. Therefore,
pgl(δg|ξ,X,E , θ1) = exp(Eg[Πgl])L∑
k=1
exp(Eg[Πgk])
(2.8)
The remaining rivals in the market similarly form their belief of ﬁrm f ’s best response. The as-
sumption of symmetric types implies that in equilibrium pg=pf=p∗. A ﬁrm’s vector of conjectures
over all locations l is deﬁned by the following set of L equations:
p∗l (δ|ξ,X,E , θ1) =
exp(Xlβ + γ0 + (E − 1)
∑
b
γb
∑
j
I
b
jlp
∗
j)
L∑
k=1
exp(Xkβ + γ0 + (E − 1)
∑
b
γb
∑
j
Ibjkp
∗
j)
(2.9)
∀ l = 1, ...,L
where the expressions for the expected number of ﬁrms per distance band have been substituted
into the payoﬀ function. Note that the market level eﬀect, ξ, does not determine sorting into
locations. Since ξ is invariant across locations within a market, it does not scale the relative
attractiveness of one location to another. The equilibrium location conjectures thus result from
the system of L equations deﬁned in equation 2.9, which makes up a ﬁxed-point mapping from the
ﬁrm’s conjecture of its competitors’ strategies into its competitors’ conjectures of the ﬁrm’s own
strategy. The following section illustrates how equilibrium conjectures are incorporated into the
expected payoﬀ function.
2.2.2 Illustration
Figure 3 depicts a square-shaped market made up of nine locations which are grouped into three
distance bands. The immediate competitors are only those in the ﬁrm’s own location. The neigh-
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boring competitors, namely those in band 1, of a ﬁrm located in cell seven are the ﬁrms located in
cells four, ﬁve, and eight, while the most distant competitors are located in cells one, two, three,
six, and nine. Based on equation 2.5, E[Π7] is given by:
E[Π7] = ξ +X7β + γ0 + (E − 1)(γ0p∗7 + γ1(p∗4 + p∗5 + p∗8) + γ2(p∗1 + p∗2 + p∗3 + p∗6 + p∗9)) (2.10)
Assuming that the competitive impact of neighboring ﬁrms, γ1, exceeds the impact of more distant
ﬁrms, γ2, the appeal of cell seven lies primarily in its placement at the edge of the city with a small
set of immediately adjacent locations and competitors. On the other hand, a ﬁrm located in cell
ﬁve will have many close-by competitors, exposing it to stronger competition than a ﬁrm located
on the city’s fringe. At the same time, from a demand perspective, cell ﬁve is more attractive than
cell seven because it grants easy access to most of the consumers in the market living in its own and
neighboring locations. The equilibrium ﬁrm location pattern is then determined by this trade-oﬀ
between demand and competitive pressures.
2.2.3 Equilibrium Properties
Equation 2.9 sets up a continuous mapping from the L-dimensional simplex into itself. Due to the
constraint that probabilities sum to one, the system reduces to (L−1) equations in (L−1) unknown
conditional location probabilities. Entrants’ equilibrium location probabilities that result from this
system in turn map into ﬁrms’ optimal strategies. Since ﬁrms’ own conjectures are contained in
the probability simplex and are continuous in competitors’ expected behavior, the existence of
at least one solution to the system of equations follows immediately from Brouwer’s Fixed Point
Theorem. To establish the uniqueness of such a solution to the system of conditional location choice
probabilities,
Ψ(p,X,E) = p− F (p,X,E) = 0, (2.11)
it is suﬃcient to show that the matrix of partial derivatives of Ψ with respect to p is a positive
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dominant diagonal matrix, or that
1.
∂Ψl
∂pl
> 0
2.
∣∣∣∣∂Ψl∂pl
∣∣∣∣ ≥∑
k =l
∣∣∣∣∂Ψl∂pk
∣∣∣∣
Consider ﬁrst the simplest example of a 2×2 city that allows for spatially diﬀerentiated competition
by letting the eﬀect of competitors in a given location to be diﬀerent from that of competitors in the
remaining three locations.12 Normalizing p4 = 1− (p1 + p2 + p3), the matrix of partial derivatives
for this speciﬁc example contains the elements
∂Ψl
∂pl
= 1− (E − 1)pl(γ0 − γ1)(1− pl + p4) (2.12)
∂Ψl
∂pk
= −(E − 1)pl(γ0 − γ1)(−pk + p4) (2.13)
k = l, l, k = 1, 2, 3
Assuming without loss of generality that p4 = min(p), conditions 1. and 2. can be established pro-
vided that the number of entrants exceeds one, or E > 1, and provided that γ0 < γ1. Consequently,
the location choice game for the 2× 2 city has a unique equilibrium as long as immediate competi-
tors that are located in the same cell drive proﬁts down by more than more distant competitors.
This simple example is suggestive of settings that entail multiple equilibrium location strategies. In
particular, if competition between ﬁrms were to actually intensify as they move further away from
each other, there may be many locations in which a ﬁrm would face the same expected number
of distant competitors and thus an identical competitive environment. Similarly, uniqueness may
break down in the case where there are positive spill-overs to clustering, that is γb is positive.
Non-uniqueness arises in these scenarios in particular if there are only little or no diﬀerences in
locations’ demographic make-up to induce additional variation in pay-oﬀs across locations.
12Expected proﬁts for this example are thus given by
E[Πfl] = ξ +Xlβ + γ0(1 + (E − 1)pl) + γ1(E − 1)
∑
k =l
pk + εfl
for l, k = 1, ..., 4.
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For the general proﬁt function in equation 2.2, the elements of the matrix of partial derivatives
are signiﬁcantly more complex as they involve locations in additional distance bands. Allowing for
three distance bands and a total of L locations, the partial derivatives of Ψ are given by:
∂Ψl
∂pl
= 1− (E − 1)pl[(I1lL(γ0 − γ1) + I2lL(γ0 − γ2))(1 − pl + pL) (2.14)
+(γ1 − γ2)(
∑
k =l
(I2kl(1− I2kL)− I1kl(1− I1kL))pk)]
∂Ψl
∂pk
= −(E − 1)pl[(I1kL(γ0 − γ1) + I2kL(γ0 − γ2))(−pk + pL) (2.15)
+(γ1 − γ2)(I1kl +
∑
j =k
(I2jk(1− I2jL)− I1jk(1− I1jL))pj)]
k = l, l, k = 1, ...,L − 1
where pL has been normalized to 1−
∑
l =L
pl and, as before, Ibkl = 1 if db ≤ dkl < db+1 and 0 otherwise.
The partial derivatives are a function of the vector of location probabilities that depends on the
dispersion of locations within the market in a complicated way. For the general payoﬀ function, it is
thus diﬃcult to establish analytical conditions that guarantee that the matrix of partial derivatives
has a positive dominant diagonal. The functional form of the partial derivatives suggests, however,
that exogenous determinants of p and the layout of locations relative to each other in a given
market are critical factors in the existence of a unique set of location probabilities.
To investigate the sensitivity of the equilibrium to within-market variation in exogenous demograph-
ics, I apply the model to a simulated data set of markets with signiﬁcant variation in demograph-
ics.13 Equilibrium conjectures are found numerically using the method of successive approximations
where the ﬁxed point results from successively improving upon an initial guess for the probability
vector until [ exp(Π1(p))∑
k
exp(Πk(p))
, ..., exp(ΠL(p))∑
k
exp(Πk(p))
]
′
results in p. The existence of a unique equilibrium can
then be established numerically if successive approximations to the equilibrium always converge to
the same solution, independent of the initial starting values.
13The simulations focus only on the case where γb is negative, that is where geographic proximity to other competi-
tors decreases proﬁts due to increased competition, rather than on the case of positive spill-overs from geographic
proximity to other ﬁrms.
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The simulations show that as long as competitive interaction becomes weaker with distance (γb
is less negative for more distant bands), the equilibrium is unique, even if locations are fully
homogeneous in demographics. Variation in exogenous demographics or a larger number of locations
proves to be necessary in ensuring uniqueness, however, for cases where γb becomes more negative
with distance implying an intensiﬁcation of competition with distance.
Expressions 2.14 and 2.15 as well as the simulation evidence thus suggest that there are two major
sources that lead to uniqueness in this model. First, heterogeneity in the demographics of nearby
locations allows for a distinction of locations with similar sets of expected competitors. Second, the
dispersion of locations over the market area implies that the sets of locations that deﬁne immediate,
neighboring, and distant competitors diﬀer across locations. There are thus few locations that have
the same sets of competitors in the various distance bands. Furthermore, the demographics faced by
neighboring and distant competitors of ﬁrm f , but not faced by ﬁrm f , provide additional exogenous
variation for f ’s expected number of competitors. When applying the model to larger, real-world
markets that are naturally made up of irregularly placed neighborhoods of varying characteristics,
the simulation evidence suggests that concerns about the location conjectures’ uniqueness can be
alleviated. In particular if competitive rivalry is stronger between competitors that are more rather
than less alike in terms of geographic proximity, implying a γb that decreases with distance, the
equilibrium is shown to be unique, mirroring the analytic results for the case of a 2× 2 city.
2.3 Accounting for the Endogeneity of the Number of Entrants
In equation 2.6, a ﬁrm’s expected number of competitors in a particular distance band is a function
of E , the number of entrants into a market. Endogeneity in E arises because a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is a
function of the number of entrants, while at the same time this payoﬀ drives the ﬁrm’s decision to
enter the market. The aggregate of all such individual entry decisions determines the number of
entrants.
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The number of entrants in a free-entry equilibrium is the result of a no-proﬁt condition. Each
entrant earns non-negative proﬁts, but any additional entrant would suﬀer losses. The predicted
number of entrants into a market m is simply:
Êm = F · Pr(entrym) (2.16)
where Pr(entrym) denotes the identical probability of entry into market m by all ﬁrms.
Entry by a ﬁrm into a market involves a comparison of a weighted average of payoﬀs across all
locations to the normalized payoﬀ of not entering. In addition to the location-speciﬁc characteristics
of the market, a ﬁrm’s payoﬀs are inﬂuenced by market-level factors that do not vary across
locations. Such market-level factors are captured in the payoﬀ function in 2.5 by ξ. A market with
a high value of ξ, for example, will support a larger number of entrants. The larger number of ﬁrms
then drives average proﬁt levels down to be on par with those earned in the remaining markets.
Given the assumption of i.i.d. extreme value proﬁtability types, Pr(entrym) is given by:
Pr(entrym) =
exp(ξm)
[
Lm∑
l=1
exp(Xml β + γ0 + (Ê
m − 1)∑
b
γb
∑
k
I
b
klp
∗m
k )
]
1 + exp(ξm)
[
Lm∑
l=1
exp(Xml β + γ0 + (Ê
m − 1)∑
b
γb
∑
k
I
b
klp
∗m
k )
] (2.17)
Equations 2.16 and 2.17 can be used to back out the realization of ξm that matches the equilibrium
number of entrants predicted by the model, Êm, to the number of ﬁrms observed in the data.
Solving equations 2.16 and 2.17 for ξm implies:
ξm = ln(Êm)− ln(F − Êm)− (2.18)
ln
(
Lm∑
l=1
exp(Xml β + γ0 + (Ê
m − 1)
∑
b
γb
∑
k
I
b
klp
∗m
k )
)
Based on equation 2.18, an equilibrium realization of ξm can be found for every market, given Êm,
which is set equal to the actual number of entrants in the market, and the potential number of
entrants, F . The solution of using the market-level eﬀect ξ to account for the endogeneity of the
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number of entrants follows the approach used by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995) in their estimation of competition in diﬀerentiated product markets.
In contrast to earlier entry models, the estimation of entry probabilities relies directly on knowl-
edge of the size of the potential entrant pool. Without specifying F , the model’s parameters can
econometrically not be identiﬁed. Determining the set of potential entrants empirically is diﬃcult,
however, since the observed data only includes actual entrants and not those that merely consider
entering, but choose not to. Earlier studies of entry into retailing (Cotterill and Haller 1992) have
dealt with this problem by setting the potential entrant pool equal to the number of major chains
in the industry. In the case of video retailing, this assumption is harder to justify since non-chain
aﬃliated retailers account for a signiﬁcant fraction of all ﬁrms. The solution I adopt is to estimate
the model by ﬁxing the potential entrant pool exogenously at varying sizes.
At one extreme, with an inﬁnite potential entrant pool, the fraction of ﬁrms entering the market
is small. The market-level eﬀect ξm adjusts, in this case, relative to the outside option’s mean
proﬁtability, which is normalized to 0, to reﬂect the revealed low attractiveness of such a market.
The reverse holds true in the case where every ﬁrm in the potential entrant pool decides to enter
signifying a high value of ξm. In the empirical implementation of the model, diﬀerent assumptions
about the size of the potential entrant pool are reﬂected in the realized value of ξm in each market.
These values for ξm determine the estimated parameters, µ and σ, of the distribution of ξ. The
results presented in section 5 show that, based on this solution to incorporating F , the estimates
of the remaining parameters that aﬀect the location-speciﬁc component of payoﬀs are fairly robust
to varying the size of the potential entrant pool.
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3 Data
The model is applied to entry and product-type choices in the video retail industry using discrete
location choices as product types. The video retail industry is well-suited for an analysis of location
choice as an instrument of product diﬀerentiation. The transaction under consideration consists
of the rental of a video tape, a homogeneous and relatively inexpensive good, with prices of the
rental transaction ranging between $2 to $4 per tape. Since a video tape is standardized, stores
diﬀerentiate themselves in other ways, including the variety and depth of inventory carried, the
terms of the rental contract concerning the rental period, and drop-oﬀ convenience. The main
avenue of diﬀerentiation arises, however, from spatial location since the small absolute diﬀerences
in prices across stores make customers unwilling to travel a long distance to carry out the rental at
a lower price. This paper concentrates entirely on the spatial dimension of product diﬀerentiation.
Seim (2001) contains an extension of the model that captures other forms of diﬀerentiation by in-
corporating two types of ﬁrms, chain stores and non-chain aﬃliated stores, each of which represents
a diﬀerent mix of product characteristics that has found success in the marketplace.
3.1 Sample Markets
Spatial diﬀerentiation will only play a signiﬁcant role in market structure if the market’s population,
or the available demand, is suﬃciently large and geographically spread out that ﬁrms can use loca-
tion strategically. According to research commissioned by the Video Software Dealers’ Association
(1998), the average customer travels only 3.2 miles for a round trip to a video store. The markets
used in this study are selected, therefore, to provide adequate scope for spatial diﬀerentiation by
ﬁrms, while not being so large that distant competitors would rarely, if ever, compete with each
other for customers. To facilitate identiﬁcation of competitors operating within each market as
well as potential customers in the market, I focus on well-delimited cities or groups of cities with
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shared boundaries.
Starting from a universe of medium-sized cities or incorporated places with a population between
40,000 and 150,000 obtained from Census data, I include in the sample cities or small groups of
cities where the largest city outside of the market within a distance of 10 miles has a population
below 10,000 and the population of the largest city within 20 miles does not exceed 25,000 people.14
This selection rule serves to exclude candidate cities if they are part of a suburban sprawl or in
a metropolitan area, which complicates the identiﬁcation of market boundaries. Cities in tourist
regions are also excluded since the resident population accounts for only a small share of the
potential customer base. Neighboring cities are assigned to the same market if they lie within
10 miles of each other and either share boundaries with a candidate city or consist of Census
tracts whose areas overlap with both cities.15 As an additional check that the chosen markets are
suﬃciently geographically isolated from other cities in the region, I visually inspect each candidate
market using regional maps. The resulting set of markets consists of 151 cities/groups of cities
drawn from most U.S. states with a slight under-representation of the North East. Market size
as measured by the included incorporated places’ total population ranges from 41,352 to 142,303
people with an average market size of 74,367 people.
Further discretization is required to give meaning to the concept of a location within a market.
First, the selected markets are divided into non-overlapping cells among which ﬁrms choose their
optimal location. Rather than superimposing a regular grid on each of the cities as in the example
14All distances are computed as great circle distances according to the Haversine formula. Based on latitude-longitude
coordinate data, the distance between two points, a and b, is given by:
da,b = 2R arcsin
[
min
{
((sin(0.5(latb − lata)))2 + cos(lata) cos(latb)(sin(0.5(lonb − lona)))2)0.5, 1
}]
where R denotes the radius of the earth. See Sinnott (1984).
15Census tracts are small subdivisions of counties rather than cities, which have an average size of 4,000 people. The
area of any given tract may therefore overlap with the area of more than one city. Census tracts that overlap
with the sample cities are identiﬁed using the Census Bureau’s geographic correspondence engine MABLE/Geocorr,
available at http://www.Census.gov/plue/. This program includes a mapping utility that is capable of providing a
comprehensive list of Census tracts whose area overlaps with each of the chosen markets. These overlapping tracts
are included as part of a market unless the area of overlap contains an insigniﬁcant proportion of the tract’s total
population.
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of the square city discussed above, I choose to divide the markets into cells along more natural lines,
namely Census tracts. While neighborhoods obviously change and shift over time, the use of Census
tracts as cells comes closer to dividing the sample markets into coherent, internally homogeneous
locations. Next, since consumers and ﬁrms are spread across the continuum of space of each of the
Census tracts, instead of integrating over this geographic space, I place all consumers and ﬁrms
at the population-weighted centroid of their tract.16 Each market is thus made up of a set of
irregularly scattered point locations within the market’s boundaries. Finally, as discussed above,
the classiﬁcation of locations into product types is complicated by the irregularity in Census tract
areas. Center-city neighborhoods are on average more densely populated compared to Census tracts
at the outskirts of the city with more sparsely populated, larger areas. Accordingly, neighboring
locations are deﬁned to be all locations within a given distance range.
On average, a sample market consists of 21 tracts, ranging from markets with only eight tracts
to markets with 49 tracts. The distance between tract centers within a market averages 3.5 miles
using population-weighted centroids as tract centers. While the distance between a tract and its
closest neighboring tract in the market is, on average, only 1.1 miles, the average distance to the
furthest tract is 8.1 miles. Given the small distances that consumers are willing to travel to rent
a video, these descriptive statistics indicate that the chosen markets are of an appropriate size to
allow for spatial diﬀerentiation without being unrealistically large.
The use of Census tracts as market subdivisions also implies an inclusion of the city’s surrounding
population that resides in a tract at the edge of the city, but not within the city’s oﬃcial boundaries.
This increases the average market size from 74,367 to 90,563 people. Given the geographic isolation
16I obtain population-weighted centroids from the Census Bureau. They are used instead of the more standard area-
weighted centroids to capture where the majority of the tract’s population lives. For locations at the edge of a city,
tracts tend to be large in area with an associated drop in population density and the area-weighted centroids generally
lie at a greater distance from the remaining tracts’ centroids than in the case of population-weighted centroids. The
use of area-weighted centroids would therefore signiﬁcantly overstate the attractiveness of these locations to ﬁrms
in the form of greater distance from competitors in other locations in the city.
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imposed upon sample markets, the population living within the market represents a large fraction
of the population residing in the general area and thus is a good approximation of the consumer
base for which stores in that market compete.
3.2 Video Rental Demand
Since store-level data on tape rentals are unavailable to me, I use the demographic characteristics
of individual locations as a proxy for video rental demand. According to industry sources, total
video demand is a function of the market’s population, but varies as well across income levels,
family status, and to a lesser extent age groups.17 These demographics are available from the
Census Bureau’s decennial Census of Population at a high level of geographic disaggregation, in-
cluding Census tracts. The available ﬁrm-level data on location choices, which dates to 1999, is
combined with demographic data from the 2000 Census of Population. In addition, a private data
vendor, Advanced Geographic Solutions, provided data on tracts’ business characteristics such as
establishment counts across all industries and daytime working population. Comparable business
summary statistics are generally not available from the Census Bureau at this level of geographic
disaggregation. The overall business establishment counts are used in part to identify whether a
tract is purely residential, namely if it does not contain any establishments. In such cases, the
tract’s population is included in market size indicators, but the tract itself is not included in the
set of possible locations that ﬁrms can choose to enter.
Table 2 provides a summary of the key variables used to estimate the model. The demographic
variables include the population in the the store’s chosen tract and in its immediate neighborhood,
17Hasting’s Book, Music and Video, Inc. 1998 Annual Report states: “Key demographic criteria for Company su-
perstores include community population, community and regional retail sales, personal and household disposable
income levels, education levels, median age, and proximity of colleges or universities...” and the Video Software
Dealers’ Association (1998) claims: “The biggest demographic factor in determining a household’s rental frequency
... is the presence of children. Almost three-fourths of all households with children rent at least once a month, while
nearly a third rent at least once a week. Among households without children, 53% rent once a month or more and
21% rent once a week.”
23
as well as the population residing in two bands around the chosen location. The use of the sur-
rounding population reﬂects, in a reduced form, that people’s shopping behavior is not conﬁned to
their immediate neighborhood, but may cover nearby areas. To capture income diﬀerences across
locations, I use population-weighted average per-capita income of the tract and of locations around
the tract, by distance band. The eﬀects of other demand drivers, such as family status and proxim-
ity to a college or university, are more diﬃcult to isolate at the tract level. Publicly available city
planning records for a subset of the markets suggests that tracts with a high percentage of house-
holds with children or tracts that are home to a college tend to be protected by zoning ordinances,
which prohibit ﬁrms from locating freely in such tracts. In the absence of detailed zoning data
for the full set of markets, these residential tracts cannot be eliminated from the location choice
set. Their inclusion in estimation confounds the role of family status and university locations as
demand factors. The estimated eﬀects of these demand drivers would not reﬂect the inherent at-
tractiveness of such locations, but capture instead that regulation dictates that residential zones
are never chosen by stores. Due to these diﬃculties in identifying potential locations, demographic
characteristics other than population and per capita income are excluded from the estimation.
The attractiveness of a retail location stems partially from the easy accessibility and convenience
that the location oﬀers to consumers. While I do not have information on whether a store is located
along a major commuting road or whether it is part of a strip mall receiving spill-over business from
other stores in the mall, a tract’s business density is used as a proxy for its commercial character.
The use of business density as a catch-all proxy for the general business environment in the location
also controls for the extent to which zoning laws enforce the residential nature of a tract. Location-
speciﬁc costs to running a retail establishment take mainly the form of property costs and lease
payments. Data on commercial rental costs is not available at as disaggregate a level as the Census
tract, however; housing costs tracked by the Census Bureau are median residential rents. The use
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of median residential rents as a cost shifter in estimation had only limited success.18 Consequently,
the results laid out in section 5 use business density as the sole proxy for the role of the commercial
environment in choosing a tract.
As table 2 shows, demographic and commercial characteristics of locations within a market diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from each other. The observed variability in demographics facilitates estimation of the
model proposed above and enhances the likelihood of observing a unique set of equilibrium location
strategies.
3.3 Video Store Locations
Firm-level data on video store locations are obtained from American Business Disc 1999. This U.S.-
wide semi-annual business directory contains information on establishment location, chain aﬃliation
and lines of business and is derived from Yellow Page directories backed by phone inquiries.19
To match up store locations with Census tracts, each store’s address is initially geo-coded. The
resulting latitude-longitude coordinates are then assigned to the corresponding Census tract.
Firms’ entry and location patterns vary signiﬁcantly by market size and area. On average, 13.68
video stores compete in a market; the smallest has four stores and the largest 33 stores. At the
tract level, both clustering in central locations as well as dispersion into locations at the city’s edges
can be observed. A signiﬁcant fraction of the locations within a market is not chosen by any ﬁrm,
but there are also locations that are selected by up to nine ﬁrms. As a result, some ﬁrms face many
nearby competitors, the maximum number of ﬁrms that are located within half a mile of a ﬁrm’s
18The estimated eﬀect of median rent levels on the likelihood of choosing a location was, as expected, negative, but
insigniﬁcant.
19The information on ﬁrm counts and locations for the public video chains derived from the database is cross-checked
against information contained in the respective ﬁrms’ public SEC ﬁlings. For the six public chains in operation in
1999, the database contains more than 95% of the chains’ outlets as per their 1998 ﬁscal year 10-K annual report.
Furthermore, the total number of listed video retail establishments is 31,774. This number closely matches analyst
estimates of the industry’s size ranging from 30,000 to 35,000 outlets. See Advanstar Communications (various
issues) and Video Software Dealers’ Association (1998).
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tract being ten stores. At the same time, some retailers choose isolated locations such that they do
not face any competitors within a 10-mile radius. Within the market area, we observe that ﬁrms
choose to locate both in the market’s center and on its outskirts, the maximum distance from the
city center reaching up to 15 miles.
The location statistics displayed in table 3 conﬁrm the irregular distribution of ﬁrms. Figure 4
shows a map of one of the smaller sample markets, Great Falls, MT, chosen for this illustration due
to its regular lay-out of Census tract neighborhoods. The city’s boundaries overlap with 20 Census
tracts, not all of which are depicted. The map shows clearly the variability in the tracts’ areas
and populations. Figure 4 also shows the number of competitors operating in each of the Census
tracts as well as in three distance bands around one of the market’s locations. The two concentric
circles around the tract depict the bands containing immediately neighboring locations, as well as
adjacent locations, which are between d0 and d1 miles away from the location.
In summary, the data available for estimation consist of a scattered set of point locations within
a market, the number of stores operating at those locations, as well as the locations’ demographic
characteristics. Furthermore, based on distances between all L locations in the market, ﬁrms’
competitors in the various distance bands are computed using pre-determined distance cut-oﬀs.
4 Market-level Determinants of Entry
Before turning to the estimation of the model laid out in section 2, I present results that document
aggregate patterns of entry at the level of the market. Market-level entry models put forth in
the literature focus on the role of the intensity of competition between ﬁrms in determining equi-
librium market structure in markets of varying sizes. These models assume that the competitive
environment is uniform across ﬁrms since their product is homogeneous. Diﬀerences between ﬁrms
may be incorporated on the cost side in the form of heterogeneous ﬁxed costs to entry, which are
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observed perfectly by all competitors. Following the set-up used in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), a
representative ﬁrm among a set of n competitors operating in market m earns proﬁt of the form:
Πmn = SmVmn(Xm;α, β)− F (Wm; γ) + εm (4.1)
A competitor’s total variable proﬁt is the product of market size, Sm, and variable proﬁt from
serving a representative consumer, Vmn(Xm;α, β), which incorporates the eﬀect of demographic
shifters, X, on proﬁt. Furthermore, each additional entrant, i, decreases variable proﬁt by an
incremental amount, αi, resulting in a variable proﬁt function of Vmn = α1+Xmβ+
∑n
i=2 αi. Total
variable proﬁt thus directly reﬂects market structure. F (Wm; γ) denotes ﬁxed costs in the form of
operating costs or barriers to entry, which are, for simplicity, assumed to be identical across ﬁrms
and market structures.20 Last, εm represents unobservable components of proﬁt that are drawn
from an i.i.d. normal distribution.
To identify the parameters of the model, an equilibrium assumption is imposed that all n active
ﬁrms in a given market have to earn non-negative proﬁts, while any additional entrant would be
unproﬁtable. The distributional assumption on εm then gives rise to an ordered Probit model of the
equilibrium number of entrants, which is econometrically identiﬁed through cross-market variation
in the observed number of competitors.21
The video retail sample covers markets with both a higher average number of competitors and a
signiﬁcantly wider range of market structures than the kinds of markets considered in the original
application. Empirically, the competitive impacts, α, can only be identiﬁed for market structure
categories that are suﬃciently represented in the data. Since only nine markets have less than
six active competitors, these are combined into a reference category with n ≤ 5.22 Furthermore,
20Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) allow ﬁxed costs to increase with the equilibrium number of entrants into a market
to capture that earlier entrants may be more eﬃcient than later entrants. Due to the wide variation in the total
number of entrants across sample markets this approach proves diﬃcult to implement in the current setting.
21For a more detailed description of the properties and derivation of the ordered probit model, see Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991), pp. 988-992.
22Proﬁt for markets with ﬁve competitors is normalized to zero.
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I combine markets with ten and eleven, twelve and 13, and 14 through 17 competitors into one
category each and assume that additional entrants beyond the 18th ﬁrm do not depress proﬁt any
further. This results in a total of eight competitive eﬀects that allow proﬁt to vary across these
market structures.
To be comparable to the results from the location-choice model presented in section 5, the total
population across each market’s Census tracts approximates market size Sm, population-weighted
per capita income is used as a demographic proﬁt shifter, Xm, and the tracts’ area-weighted average
business density is used as a cost shifter Wm. Table 4 displays the results of the ordered Probit
estimation. The demographic parameters are signiﬁcant and have the anticipated signs. The
competitive impacts are consistently negative, driving down proﬁts as more ﬁrms enter. However,
they are not statistically signiﬁcant, possibly due to the large number of competitive eﬀects that
need to be estimated to cover the range of market structures represented in the data.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) use the concept of a zero-proﬁt equilibrium level of demand or entry
threshold to measure the rate at which oligopoly proﬁts decline. An entry threshold expressed in
terms of market size captures the minimum level of demand each ﬁrm would require in equilibrium
to break even. A comparison of entry thresholds across diﬀerent market structures provides evidence
of the extent to which margins decline as the number of competitors increases. Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991) ﬁnd, for example, that for the set of professional services industries they study, a monopolist
on average requires 39% fewer customers to break even than a duopolist in the more competitive
environment. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) ﬁnd also that by the time a market has three or more
competitors, per-ﬁrm entry thresholds do not increase any further. For small markets with fewer
than three competitors, this implies a nonlinear relationship between total market size and the
equilibrium number of competitors, with the number of competitors increasing in population at a
decreasing rate. For larger markets, however, the relationship between market size and number of
ﬁrms is approximately linear.
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The bottom panel of table 4 contains corresponding entry thresholds at the level of the market
and the ﬁrm for the sample video retailers. For market structure categories that span two or more
diﬀerent ﬁrm counts, such as the category that includes both ten and eleven competitors, per-ﬁrm
entry thresholds are computed at the average ﬁrm count for markets in that category. The per-
ﬁrm entry thresholds suggest that across markets, each video retailer requires a population base of
approximately 7,000 people to break even. In contrast to the small markets covered by Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991), even in the smallest markets in the sample, at least four video stores are in
operation. The entry thresholds are very similar across markets with diﬀerent numbers of ﬁrms.23
These ﬁndings are consistent with Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1991) results for larger markets, in that
they entail an approximately linear relationship between market size and equilibrium number of
competitors for the speciﬁc range of video store market structures covered by the sample.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) suggest several reasons for constant per-ﬁrm entry thresholds. In
homogeneous product industries, entry thresholds decrease in ﬁrm margins and entrants’ eﬃciency.
The proportional entry thresholds they ﬁnd suggest that once a market has grown in size to three
or more entrants, margins no longer change signiﬁcantly. This set-up applies well to the extremely
small local markets and professional service industries considered in the study. In diﬀerentiated
product industries, however, similar entry thresholds across markets of varying sizes may simply
indicate that product diﬀerentiation oﬀsets competitive decreases in margins with larger numbers
of competitors. This alternative explanation put forth in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) is explored
further in the remainder of the paper, using the above model of location choice. While the video
retail industry exhibits similar features to the industries in earlier studies and is therefore arguably
a homogeneous product industry, the larger geographic extent of the sample markets nevertheless
awards ﬁrms an opportunity for product diﬀerentiation. The location-choice model allows for a
23A likelihood ratio test based on a restricted model that enforces equal entry thresholds across all ﬁrm count categories
yields a test statistic of 22.32 ∼ χ(7), allowing us to reject the null hypothesis of full threshold proportionality across
all market structures, however.
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detailed analysis of the importance of such diﬀerentiation in entry decisions at a disaggregate
neighborhood level in markets with a larger number of competitors.
5 Estimation and Results
5.1 Estimation
For the purposes of estimating the location-choice model, ﬁrms are placed into one of three distance
bands and the distance cut-oﬀs that deﬁne these bands are set to d0 = 0.5 miles and d1 = 3 miles, in
accordance with Video Software Dealers’ Association (1998) ﬁgures on customers’ travel patterns.
Thus, immediate competitors include all ﬁrms located within one half of a mile from each other
and neighboring competitors those between one half and three miles from each other. Since the
markets vary signiﬁcantly in their area and thus in the maximum distance between tracts, the band
covering the most distant locations is deﬁned only with respect to the minimum distance that a
pair of tracts has to satisfy to fall within that band. All ﬁrms in the city competing at a distance
of more than, in this case, three miles from one another will have the same incremental impact on
proﬁtability. Given the localized nature of video rental demand, this assumption appears justiﬁed
for the chosen cutoﬀ value. Experimenting with the cutoﬀ between the neighboring and remaining
categories had only small quantitative eﬀects on the results.
Thus, the payoﬀ function that is taken to the data is:
Πfl = ξ +Xlβ + γ0N0l + γ1N1l + γ2N2l + εfl (5.1)
The demographic characteristics contained in X are each band’s total population and average per
capita income, as well as its business density.
Given observations on a cross-section of M markets, each of which is treated as an independent
F m-player location game, the likelihood function is given by:
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L(θ1, θ2) =
M∏
m=1
pθ1(d
m|ξm,Xm, Êm)gθ2(ξm|Xm, Êm,F m) (5.2)
where dm = (dm1 , d
m
2 , ..., d
m
Fm) denotes the vector of actions taken by the F
m players in market m.
The likelihood function consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part computes the likelihood of observing
entrants’ location choices conditional on the market-level eﬀect ξm. To derive the unconditional
likelihood, I integrate over the distribution of ξm, G(·). ξm is assumed to be an i.i.d. draw from a
normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. The density of each observation ξm is
denoted by gθ2 , with θ2 = (µ, σ).
Estimation of the model involves two steps. For a given set of values for the parameter vector
(θ1, θ2) and the tracts’ demographic data, the system of equations in 2.9 is solved numerically for
its ﬁxed point for each of the markets in the sample. Successive approximations to the ﬁxed point
result in a vector of equilibrium location choice probabilities, pm.24 The equilibrium location choice
probabilities, together with Êm and F , feed into equation 2.18 to yield an equilibrium realization
of the market-level unobservable ξ for each market m.
The optimal parameter values then are found by nesting the ﬁxed point algorithm into a maximum
likelihood routine to ﬁnd the optimal parameters that explain the observed location patterns. The
parameters to be estimated include both β and γ, which characterize the payoﬀ function, and the
parameters describing the distribution of the market-level eﬀect, µ and σ. Parameter estimates
are obtained by maximizing equation 5.2 using a Nelder-Meade optimization algorithm. Starting
values for the optimization routine are found by performing a grid search over the parameter space.
24Explicitly solving for the equilibrium may be computationally burdensome for more complex models than the one
considered here. Alternatives to using a nested ﬁxed-point algorithm have been suggested by Ahn and Manski (1993)
for a binary choice model under uncertainty and by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) for a dynamic discrete game
of imperfect information. These approaches rely on initial non-parametric estimates of the respective expectations
and equilibrium choice probabilities to then derive players’ optimal decisions and draw inference on underlying
preferences parametrically.
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5.2 Empirical Results
As discussed in section 2.3, in the absence of data to determine the number of video retailers that
may consider entry into any given market, I investigate the robustness of the estimation results
to two assumptions about the size of the potential entrant pool. The alternative measures consist
of an example of a large potential entrant pool, ﬁxed at 50 ﬁrms for each of the markets, and an
example of a potential entrant pool that is, for most markets, signiﬁcantly smaller by setting F
equal to twice the actually observed number of entrants in each market. The estimated parameters
under these alternative measures for the size of the potential entrant pool are displayed in table 5.
The impact of changing the size of the potential entrant pool is most pronounced in the estimate of
the mean of the market-level eﬀect, µ. The two speciﬁcations are such that in the case of a 50-ﬁrm
potential entrant pool, for most markets a smaller fraction of ﬁrms decides to enter than in the
case of a potential entrant pool that is ﬁxed at twice the number of actual entrants. The model
explains this small fraction of entrants as due to a lack of attractive demographic characteristics.
Consequently, the mean unobserved market-level eﬀect has to be lower if we observe fewer ﬁrms
entering the market than in the case where a large fraction of potential entrants enters. This results
in a signiﬁcantly lower estimate for µ in the case of the 50-ﬁrm potential entrant pool relative to
the pool size set to twice the actual number of entrants.
The location-speciﬁc component of payoﬀs varies, in contrast to ξ, only with the actual number of
entrants, Ê , rather than F . The estimates of the parameters that determine these location-speciﬁc
payoﬀs are very similar across the two speciﬁcations. Most of the parameter estimates are statis-
tically signiﬁcant at traditional levels and of the anticipated sign. Table 5 also contains estimated
marginal eﬀects for the exogenous demographic variables. The marginal eﬀects are computed by
numerically diﬀerentiating the location-choice probabilities with respect to each demographic vari-
able. The percent response in probabilities to a one-percent increase in each demographic variable
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above its observed average across all locations in the data set is computed on a location-by-location
basis. The reported marginal eﬀects represent the average response in probabilities across markets
and locations.25
Population has a large and positive eﬀect on payoﬀs, but this eﬀect decreases signiﬁcantly with dis-
tance. A one-percent increase in the location’s own population implies, for example, approximately
a three-percent increase in the likelihood of choosing this location. In contrast, a one-percent in-
crease in the most distant population in the market area increases the likelihood of choosing the
location by only one to two percent. Business density has a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁtability,
while average per capita income has the expected positive eﬀect on proﬁtability, both in the location
itself as well as in the remainder of the market. As with population, however, primarily income
levels in the chosen location and in immediately neighboring locations where the store’s customers
are likely to reside have practical signiﬁcance for proﬁtability. Per-capita income levels in the most
distant locations have marginal eﬀects on the likelihood of choosing a location of approximately
0.9%, about half of the marginal eﬀect of average per-capita income levels in the chosen location
and neighboring locations in the ﬁrst distance band.
As expected, the presence of competitors has a negative eﬀect on payoﬀs. This eﬀect decreases
signiﬁcantly, however, with distance. For example, the presence of an additional competitor within
half a mile from a ﬁrm’s location has a payoﬀ eﬀect that is approximately 70% stronger than the
eﬀect of an additional competitor within one half to three miles who in turn would have a 52 to 66%
stronger eﬀect than a competitor located more than 3 miles away in the market. Thus, incentives
for ﬁrms to diﬀerentiate are strong: spatial diﬀerentiation can eﬀectively shield one’s proﬁt from a
large number of the rivals operating in the same market.
Figure 5 depicts the distribution of prediction errors based on the parameter estimates displayed
25Marginal eﬀects cannot be computed for the endogenously determined expected number of competitors in the chosen
location and in surrounding locations.
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in the fourth column of table 5. The mode of the distribution is slightly below zero. This skewed
distribution is due to the fact that the Logit functional form assumption results in strictly positive
probabilities for all location choices, even though many locations are ex-post not chosen by any ﬁrm.
At the extreme, we observe some prediction errors that are rather large. On average, however, the
included demographic characteristics and competitive eﬀects predict location patterns fairly well.
Similarly, ﬁgure 6 shows the empirical distribution of the market-level eﬀects for a 50-ﬁrm potential
entrant pool, as implied by the equilibrium condition that the predicted number of entrants equal
the actual number of entrants in each of the markets. Figure 6 compares these standardized market-
level eﬀects to the assumed normal distribution for ξ. While the empirical distribution puts more
weight on the center than the theoretical distribution, it approximates a bell curve.
5.3 Illustration of Results
The results from the market-level model of entry presented above imply that for this sample of
medium-sized video markets, per-ﬁrm entry thresholds are not aﬀected diﬀerentially by the number
of competitors a ﬁrm faces in the market. The estimated parameters of the location-choice model
suggest further that at the level of the neighborhood, the competitive interaction between ﬁrms is
strong. Thus while competition may be intense locally, ﬁrms exploit the geographic dispersion in
their demand to lessen the competitive interaction with more distant rivals.
To quantify the importance of product characteristic choices in the entry process, it is necessary to
measure empirically the extent of the product characteristic space. In the case of physical location
in clearly delimited markets, the size and boundaries of the characteristic space are well-deﬁned,
consisting of the area that the city covers. For other forms of product diﬀerentiation, the maximum
degree to which ﬁrms can diﬀerentiate and how consumers are distributed across the various product
types is not as easily observable. Because of these advantages of spatial diﬀerentiation, the setting
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lends itself to performing counterfactual analyses of the importance of individual features of the
product-type space, such as its area and the distribution of consumers within the space, on market
structure.
I perform one such counterfactual exercise by considering the role of the overall size of the charac-
teristic space, here simply the geographic dispersion of demand, in aﬀecting entry into the market.
Other exercises of interest might include an investigation of the eﬀect on entry of governmental
regulation that restricts the extent of product diﬀerentiation between ﬁrms. In the context of spa-
tial diﬀerentiation, such regulation most commonly takes the form of zoning ordinances that limit
ﬁrms’ abilities to locate freely within the entire area of a city. Similar examples from other contexts
include licensing or minimum safety standards.
To isolate the eﬀect of the extent of spatial dispersion in demand on market structure, one needs to
recognize that as a city grows in size, not only does the city spread out spatially, but its population
increases as well. Simply comparing predicted entry patterns across the sample markets that vary
signiﬁcantly in size thus does not allow us to separate the eﬀect of the increased scope for spatial
diﬀerentiation from the eﬀect of the overall increase and scatter in population and thus market
demand. To separate the contribution of each of these factors on the number of entrants that a
market can support, I compare entry under two city growth scenarios.
The ﬁrst scenario allows a city to grow in population only, holding its geographic layout ﬁxed.
Firms are thus still able to diﬀerentiate spatially, however, their scope for spatial diﬀerentiation
does not change since the total area of the city does not grow in proportion to the population. To
do so, I take one of the smallest sample cities, Jamestown, NY, with twelve Census tract locations,
and artiﬁcially increase Jamestown’s population in increments of 1,500 people. The growth process
leaves the number of locations, their lay-out, and the relative population shares across locations
unchanged. As the population rises, it is thus only the population density in the twelve locations
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that increases, leaving the area that the city occupies unchanged.
Predicted entry under this city expansion path is then contrasted with entry that would occur were
the city to grow both in population and area. While it is diﬃcult to simulate how Jamestown,
NY speciﬁcally would expand if it grew along both of these dimensions, the cross-section of sample
markets can be used as a proxy for this growth path. The sample markets are suitable for this
purpose since they span a range of market sizes from Jamestown, NY at the lower end with
a population of 52,583 to larger markets such as Fort Collins, CO, with a population 178,070.
Furthermore, the larger cities in the sample naturally cover larger area than the smaller cities, and
can thus serve to represent how Jamestown may look like were it to grow in population to their
level.
Based on the estimated parameters for the 50-ﬁrm potential entrant pool, I compute the expected
number of entrants for the two city-growth scenarios. To do so, I integrate over the numerical
distribution of the market-level eﬀect ξ and ﬁnd predicted location probabilities and entrants that
are consistent with the market-level eﬀect, the actual number of entrants into the market, and the
market’s exogenous characteristics. To abstract from cross-market and cross-location variations in
business density and per-capita income that could drive entry patterns, I set these variables equal
to the business density and per-capita income in Jamestown for all locations in the data.
Two opposing eﬀects drive entry into a market when the spatial dimension of city growth is removed.
The ﬁrst eﬀect comes from intensiﬁed competition. If the market area does not grow with a city’s
population, ﬁrms cannot spread out in space any further, decreasing the incentive for additional
entry. The second, countervailing eﬀect arises due to the fact that population becomes more dense
within the given market area and ﬁrms will ﬁnd a larger number of consumers in the immediate
neighborhood of their store. The increased access to nearby consumers thus increases the incentive
for additional entry into the growing city relative to a city that grows in both population and space.
The net eﬀect of these two forces determines whether entry into a city with a ﬁxed market area
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exceeds or falls short of entry that we observe in markets that naturally grow in population and
area.
Figure 7 illustrates the role of geographic dispersion on expected entry as cities grow in population.
In both panels, the scattered points correspond to predicted entry into the actual sample markets.
The solid line represents the growth path of average predicted entry into the expanding Jamestown
market, while the dotted lines denote the corresponding 95% conﬁdence bands for entry.26
To separate the competition and demand eﬀects of city growth, the top panel displays entry pre-
dictions assuming that the impact of population on payoﬀs does not vary by distance band. In
particular, I set the three population parameters equal to the estimated parameter on population
in the 0.5-to-3-mile distance band. As a city grows, the additional population then has the same
impact on payoﬀs, regardless of where the population is located within the market. The chart
demonstrates the eﬀect of increasing a market’s geographic space on ﬁrms’ ability to capture local-
ized market power by spatial diﬀerentiation. By the time Jamestown has grown in population to
150,000, allowing ﬁrms to also scatter in space amounts to an increase in the expected number of
entrants of approximately ten stores. The diﬀerence between the two paths of expected entrants
thus represents the contribution that the increased scope for spatial diﬀerentiation among ﬁrms
makes to the number of ﬁrms that can proﬁtably co-exist in growing markets.
Once one recognizes, however, that, as a city grows in space, customers at one end of the city
are less likely to frequent a store at the other end of the city, the importance of the additional
scope for diﬀerentiation decreases. The lower panel of ﬁgure 7 shows entry predictions that take
both the population and competition eﬀects into account. The estimated parameters for the entry
and location choice model imply a localized pattern to the role of population in driving payoﬀs.
The population in the immediate neighborhood of a ﬁrm’s location has a higher payoﬀ eﬀect than
26The conﬁdence bands are derived using bootstrap methods by predicting entry under 500 draws from the estimated
parameter distribution for the 50-ﬁrm potential entrant pool.
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the population in the remaining two, more distant, bands. The implication of this pattern on
entry is that once the spatial aspect of city growth is removed, increased access to population in
the immediate neighborhood increases pay oﬀs, but this contribution falls short of the eﬀect of
increased competitive intensity on payoﬀs. As a result, predicted entry into the sample markets
exceeds predicted entry into the growing Jamestown market with a ﬁxed area, on average. The
competition eﬀect thus dominates. On net, however, allowing the area of the city to increase with
its population does not lead to very signiﬁcant increases in the predicted number of entrants; most
of the predicted entry values for the actual sample markets fall within the 95% conﬁdence band of
predicted entry under the ﬁxed market area. The results thus indicate that the absolute size of the
market area has only limited implications for payoﬀs and consequently entry, probably since video
retailing is an example of an industry where consumers’ willingness to travel a long distance to a
video store is low and demand is very local.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has presented a framework for incorporating endogenous product-type choices into ﬁrms’
entry decisions and has measured the subsequent impact on market structure. Firm interaction is
modeled as a static game of imperfect information where ﬁrms do not have complete knowledge
of the types of rivals they will be competing with in equilibrium. Entry and product-type choices
thus involve uncertainty regarding the intensity of post-entry competition and payoﬀs.
Competition is treated as a spill-over from ﬁrm agglomeration, the exact magnitude of which is
uncertain. Firms endogenously sort into diﬀerent locations within a market area depending on their
expectation of the intensity of competition produced by rivals’ simultaneous choices. This modeling
approach resembles equilibrium models of social interaction that incorporate neighborhood eﬀects
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into an agent’s payoﬀ or utility function.27 The endogenous sorting model studied here is a small
sample counterpart to these population-based models where the equilibrium represents, rather than
the aggregate share of the population, a rival’s likelihood of choosing a given location.
Modeling entry using an incomplete information framework entails some signiﬁcant diﬀerences,
compared to a game of complete information, in the characterization of the equilibrium. In a
perfect information model, a given ﬁrm distribution across locations constitutes an equilibrium if
each ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts and none of the competitors has an incentive to deviate after having
made its location choice. To conﬁrm that a given ﬁrm conﬁguration is an equilibrium thus entails
verifying that the speciﬁc conﬁguration is more proﬁtable for each and every ﬁrm than any other
possible conﬁguration. Computing an equilibrium conﬁguration in such a model is diﬃcult for
markets with large numbers of locations and ﬁrms. In contrast, equilibrium location choices in
the incomplete information framework result from ﬁrms integrating over competitors’ uncertain
location strategies. Rivals’ discrete actions are thereby transformed into smooth predicted location
probabilities that are equal across ﬁrms in equilibrium. Due to its easily solvable equilibrium
location conjectures, the Bayesian equilibrium concept greatly facilitates applying the model to a
realistic, large-dimensional product-type choice set.
The conditions under which a unique equilibrium exists in discrete games of perfect information are
quite restrictive (Mazzeo 2002, Reiss 1996). Numerical simulations suggest, however, that a unique
equilibrium exists in the imperfect information game provided the exogenous data exhibit suﬃcient
variation across locations. This will be true both in the case where ﬁrm clustering results in positive
spill-overs to each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ and, under signiﬁcantly weaker restrictions on the data, in the case
studied here where the empirical results indicate a negative payoﬀ eﬀect from ﬁrm clustering.
27For a survey of recent developments in the speciﬁcation and estimation of interactions-based models, see Brock and
Durlauf (2001). Examples of empirical applications of endogenous sorting models into neighborhoods include Bayer,
McMillan, and Rueben (2002) and Timmins (2003).
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One characteristic of the equilibrium concept presented here that is not shared by the corresponding
perfect information model arises from the fact that ﬁrms are not allowed to coordinate moves when
making location choices. Since such choices are instead conditioned on the expectation of rivals’
moves, the model allows for ex-post regret: a ﬁrm may choose a location that, once its competitors’
moves are observed, is no longer its optimal choice. As an example of a scenario with a high
likelihood of ex-post regret, suppose that two ﬁrms’ type realizations are such that, given their
expectation of the rival’s location choice, they choose to locate in the same cell. Ex-post, these
strategies will be optimal only if both ﬁrms’ type realizations are suﬃciently large to outweigh the
eﬀect of intensiﬁed competition so that clustering continues to dominate other location strategies.
Such extreme clustering in one location as an equilibrium outcome of the model is, however, unlikely
in large markets with large competitor sets. Additionally, the model’s allowance for possible ex-post
regret corresponds better to real-world environments and decision-making by ﬁrms. This holds in
particular in cases where largely unobservable or unmeasurable ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital contributes
signiﬁcantly to ﬁrm proﬁtability, such as marketing and advertising activities.
In this paper, market structure is assumed to be the equilibrium outcome of ﬁrms’ comparisons of
the one-time post-entry payoﬀs from entering at a particular location to the option of not entering.
While in reality, ﬁrms do not move simultaneously, the motivation behind this albeit restrictive set-
up is twofold. One reason is that information on ﬁrms’ sequence of moves and the market conditions
at the time at which they make their moves is diﬃcult to obtain. A second, potentially more severe
drawback is that dynamic models of ﬁrm and industry evolution such as the one suggested by
Ericson and Pakes (1995) are computationally complex and diﬃcult to estimate for large markets
with many product-types and many competitors. Similar to other empirical models of ﬁrm entry,
the static model presented here is therefore assumed to approximate the repeated ﬁrm interaction
that characterizes the evolution of an industry. Further work on empirically implementing dynamic
games of ﬁrm interaction is necessary to evaluate the validity of this assumption.
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The model is applied to spatial product-type choices using data from the U.S. video retail industry,
an industry where location is a major source of product diﬀerentiation among ﬁrms. The empirical
results indicate that ﬁrms have strong incentives to diﬀerentiate spatially. At the aggregate level,
the relationship between the number of ﬁrms and market size indicates that loss in margins due
to a larger number of competitors is weighed against the larger scope for diﬀerentiation in larger
markets. Rivalry between ﬁrms decreases signiﬁcantly with distance providing an incentive for
ﬁrms to spread away from each other. This incentive may be countered, however, by diﬀerences in
demand characteristics across locations that are of equal importance in driving payoﬀs. City growth
experiments show that ﬁrms’ abilities to capture localized market power by spatial diﬀerentiation
increase with the size of the product space. As the product space grows, however, population
spreads out as well limiting the beneﬁts of such spatial diﬀerentiation. Conditioning on population,
expanding the product space thus induces only slightly higher entry than in the alternative scenario
where a market’s spatial dispersion of demand is held ﬁxed.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Markets and Locations
151 Sample Markets
Mean Minimum Maximum
Market level
Population, market 74,367 41,352 142,303
Population, main city 59,428 40,495 140,949
Population, all tracts in market 92,563 41,614 193,322
Largest Incorporated Place within 10 mi 2,618 - 9,972
Largest Incorporated Place within 20 mi 7,916 - 24,725
Tract level
Number of tracts 21.13 8 49
Number of store locations 18.72 7 44
Tract population 4,380 247 32,468
Area (sqmi) 10.10 0.10 181.50
Average distance (mi) to
other locations in market 3.49 1.08 8.05
Notes:
The largest incorporated place within 10 and 20 miles is relative to the centroid of the
market’s main city. The distance between locations within a market is computed as the
distance between the tracts’ population-weighted centroids. Demographic data is as of
1999.
Table 2: Tract-level Demographic Characteristics
Mean Minimum Maximum
Demographic characteristics
Population 4,417 247 20,163
Population, within 0.5 mi of tract 4,952 247 23,676
Population, 0.5 - 3 mi of tract 42,281 0 145,499
Population, 3 - 10 mi of tract 54,817 0 169,271
Per capita income, within 0.5 mi of tract 17,807 3,484 60,347
Per capita income, 0.5 - 3 mi of tract 17,413 0 38,934
Per capita income, 3 - 10 mi of tract 19,417 0 38,452
Business characteristics
Establishment density per square mile 177.86 0.15 5239.48
Notes:
The tract’s total population is placed at the population-weighted centroid. Population
within diﬀerent distance bands to the tract under consideration is computed as the sum of
the population in tracts for which the distance to the considered tract’s centroid falls within
the speciﬁed range. Demographic data is as of 1999.
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Table 3: Store Location Patterns, Sample Markets
Mean Minimum Maximum
Firms, market 13.68 4.00 33.00
Store clustering
Firms, tract 0.73 0.00 9.00
Firms, within 0.5 mi of tract 0.80 0.00 10.00
Firms, within 0.5 - 3 mi of tract 6.12 0.00 27.00
Firms, within 3 - 10 mi of tract 7.94 0.00 33.00
Location patterns within city’s area
Distance to city center (mi)1 3.02 0.02 14.96
Notes:
All stores are placed at the tract’s population-weighted centroid. Competitors
within diﬀerent distance bands to a ﬁrm’s location are computed as the number of
ﬁrms in tracts for which the distance to the ﬁrm’s tract falls in the speciﬁed range.
1 The city center is taken to be the population-weighted centroid of the market’s
main city.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates, Perfect Information
Ordered Probit Model
Markets in
Coeﬃcient Std. Error Category
Population (α1) 2.6362 1.0174
Per-Capita Income 1.3109 0.5322
Business Density 0.3746 2.0009
γ -2.4977 1.0478
α2 -0.1978 0.8667 n = 7 7
α3 -0.3990 0.9494 n = 8 18
α4 -0.7395 1.0121 n = 9 16
α5 -0.4690 0.9330 n = 10 − 11 19
α6 -0.4801 0.9782 n = 12 − 13 29
α7 -0.7405 1.1829 n = 14 − 17 26
α8 -0.7742 1.5380 n ≥ 18 21
Log-likelihood -278.49
Per Firm Entry Thres-
Entry Entry Thres- hold Ratios
Firms Threshold hold (sn) (sn/sn−1)
n = 6 46.4452 7.7409
n = 7 48.3358 6.9051 0.8920
n = 8 52.6614 6.5827 0.9533
n = 9 63.1288 7.0143 1.0656
n = 10− 11 72.2361 6.8600 0.9780
n = 12− 13 84.7502 6.8457 0.9979
n = 14− 17 115.6565 7.3902 1.0795
n ≥ 18 186.9205 8.6258 1.1672
Notes:
Results based on 1999 demographic and ﬁrm data. Enty thresholds are
expressed in thousands of people. The likelihood ratio test statistic for
s6 = s7 = s8 = s9 = s10−11 = s12−13 = s14−17 = s≥18 equals 22.32,
distributed χ2(7).
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates, Entry and Location Choice Model
Potential Entrant Pool =
2 x Total Entrants 50 Firms
Coeﬃcient Marginal Coeﬃcient Marginal
Variable (Std. Error) Eﬀect (Std. Error) Eﬀect
Population0 (000) 1.8191 0.0333 2.1258 0.0393
(0.1534) (0.1764)
Population1 (000) 1.3109 0.0236 1.7349 0.0314
(0.1200) (0.1498)
Population2 (000) 0.6070 0.0121 1.1348 0.0227
(0.1192) (0.1486)
Business density -0.8077 -0.0155 -0.8889 -0.0173
(0.1458) (0.1477)
Avg. Per-Capita Income0 (0000) 0.9309 0.0180 1.0380 0.0204
(0.1136) (0.1233)
Avg. Per-Capita Income1 (0000) 1.0081 0.0193 0.9188 0.0178
(0.2081) (0.2043)
Avg. Per-Capita Income2 (0000) 0.4851 0.0092 0.4884 0.0094
(0.2512) (0.2601)
γ0 -3.4520 -3.3853
(0.3111) (0.3266)
γ1 -1.0103 -1.0087
(0.0745) (0.0923)
γ2 -0.3448 -0.4870
(0.0738) (0.0934)
σ 3.5829 4.6760
(0.3110) (0.4316)
µ -2.8764 -7.0364
(1.3425) (1.5801)
Notes:
Results based on 1999 demographic and ﬁrm data. Subscript 0 denotes the immediately adjacent
locations to the chosen tract, within 0.5 miles in distance; subscript 1 denotes tracts at 0.5 to 3
miles in distance from the chosen tract; and subscript 2 denotes tracts at more than 3 miles
distance from the chosen tract. Tract-level business density is deﬁned as the number of
establishments (0000) per square mile. γ denotes competitive eﬀects, and σ and µ
the estimates of the parameters of the distribution of ξ.
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Figure 1: Joint Entry and Location Choice Decision Tree
no entry entry
i=1 i=2 .... i=Li=0
Potential Entrant Pool Nmax
Locations
Figure 2: Illustration of Census Tract Irregularities - Wilmington, NC
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Figure 3: Impact on Proﬁts of Competitors’ Locations: Illustration
Figure 4: Sample Market - Great Falls, MT
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Figure 5: Distribution of Prediction Errors, Location Choice Probabilities
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Figure 6: Distribution of Market-Level Eﬀects
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Figure 7: The Role of Spatial Dispersion on Entry
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Note: Predicted entry patterns are based on estimated parameters for the 50-firm potential entrant pool. To isolate the effect of 
competition on entry in panel (A), all population parameters are set to the estimated effect on pay-off of population within 0.5 to 
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